

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)  
PBX and SAFE Issues

FROM:   
Chief, Customer Service Group  
2D0117 HQ

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

14 May 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. D/OIT  
2D00 HQ

Ed:

talked to me on Thursday about some PBX issues and also some SAFE issues:  
1) OIR's concerns about the plans for SAFE CIA and DIA separation, and 2) Concerns about cost growth in '87 (since April \$2 million). Ron left these two (attached) memos which he wants to discuss with you on Monday. (He is scheduled to see you Monday at 11:30.)

I did not pursue the SAFE issues.

Doris

Note for: D/OIT  
From: D/OIR

May 8, 1987

Subject: DIA/CIA Separation Plan

STAT The factors listed below are intended to serve only as a starting point for thinking about the separation issue. Clearly OIT can decide the scope and duration of technical support to be provided to DIA.

We met on 8 May with [ ] to discuss in general terms what to do about separation. As a result of that session, he will try to define what DIA needs from CIA (\$, technical support, AIM support, etc.) to effect separation. He will get back to us in a couple of weeks.

Over the next two months it will be necessary, I believe, to have several sessions among DIA, OIT, and OIR to iron out differences, or at least to delineate differences for our bosses. Those sessions should include people only up to our level. I think we should not involve the DDA and the DDI until we have a specific plan or a set of options for their consideration.

STAT The following factors should be incorporated in a separation plan:

- o The limitation of CIA funds for DIA unique development is [ ] in FY88. That ends any CIA financial support to DIA.

- o The separation must take place at the earliest possible date -- no later than the start of FY88. This means that two CSPO organizations are necessary, one for the DOD and one for the CIA.

- o The separation plan may extend the support required from OIT beyond FY88. OIT is willing to dedicate the resources it currently has invested in CSPO and in systems programming resources in order to expedite the separation date.

- o The consideration of core software may be negotiated in order to expedite separation. However, there must be a CIA plan to reduce the actual amount of software that is jointly controlled with the objective of moving away from any jointly controlled software (so called "core") by the end of FY88.

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NOTE TO: Edward J. Maloney

Ed, I have provided both you and Frank with a draft concept where the goal of separation was to make both Agencies self-sufficient. I have attached some discussion points and a draft concept which I believe represents a win-win way out of this mess. I have tried to be objective, but it is not a popular position these days. Anyhow, what follows is the "other" alternative which, I think recognizes political reality higher than both Agencies' desires. Be interested in your thoughts.

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SAFE DISCUSSION POINTS

- o Current SAFE Architecture cannot support required availability and performance. Reasons: AIM, INQUIRE, Complexity
- o Current SAFE Architecture is on trailing edge of technology
- o Current SAFE Architecture mandates sole source support for:
  - LOGICON -- 98% Of All SAFE Applications Code
  - INFODATA -- INQUIRE with endless stream of performance enhancements
  - NSEG -- AIM with endless stream of performance enhancements
- o Current SAFE Architecture mandates long term relationship with DIA AIM Main Driver, but a bug here is a bug there and/or vice versa
- o As more analysts are exposed to SAFE, SAFE becomes a necessary tool
- o SAFE Delivery 3+ will serve  analysts at both Agencies. Demand will be high for connectivity, performance, and availability.  
OIR FACT
- o Yet, see first bullet
- o Both Agencies, therefore, will have to pour funds into improving connectivity, performance, and availability. These improvements will come at the expense of functionality, but will never achieve acceptable levels. These improvements for the most part are not site-unique.
- o Therefore, movement toward a new SAFE architecture will commence at both Agencies. This will be very expensive.
- o Oversight groups will once again insist on joint venture. This time their case will be stronger as SAFE will already be in 3-4 locations with over 90% common code.

CONCLUSION: Total separation really makes no sense and, in fact, will most likely be prevented by oversight groups.

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PROPOSAL

- o Recognize that Delivery 3+ is joint baseline and that both Agencies will always be customers of this system as long as requirements exist.
- o End cost-sharing for Delivery 4.0 ASAP.
- o Rename and return Delivery 4.0 to DIA. Develop ICD between SAFE and IDB (Delivery 4.0)
- o Establish funding profiles and cost accounting systems which will allow each Agency chance to either jointly or singly fund enhancements depending on need.
- o Establish CM plan and management approach to allow Agency-unique or joint development ventures.
- o Begin serious look at a new SAFE architecture.
- o Move CSPO out of CIA Building into "neutral" space requiring only one set of Agency clearances.
- o Rotate CSPO Directors every two years between Agencies or move permanently to IC Staff.

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